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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
J. DESMOND BESS and ) 
KRISTINE BESS, ) 
) RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiffs/Appellants ) 
vs. ) 
RONALD L. JENSEN and ) Case No. 880394-CA 
PATRICIA JENSEN, ) 
) (Civil No. CV87-1258) 
Defendant/Respondents. ) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
matter pursuant to Section 78-2(a)-3 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
(1953, as amended) and pursuant to Rule 3 of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the Fourth 
District Court on April 6, 1988, by Judge Ballif. The appeal 
addresses only that part of the judgment rendered by Judge Ballif 
involving the non termination of a Lease Option Agreement. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The appeal before this Court concerns a Option agreement 
created by the parties along with a lease agreement on the same 
property. The Lease and the Option Contract are distinct and 
separate agreements containing separate consideration and 
restrictions. Judge Ballif found the Jensen's in default of the 
lease, and thereby terminated the agreement. However, Judge 
Ballif did not terminate the Option finding it still viable 
inasmuch as the Jensen's had maintained their part of the Option 
Contract. The issue raised by Petitioner questions whether Judge 
Balliffs factual decision regarding the termination of the Lease 
independent of the Option Contract creates an error of law. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Petitioner references Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended, Section 78-36-1. Respondent contends that this 
statute's applicability is limited, in its determinative nature, 
to the termination of the Lease and has no determinative effect 
on the option. Utah case law on contract interpretation and 
enforceability, as well as doctrines of equity and good 
conscience, will determine the status of the Option Contract 
before this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Jensen's entered into a three year lease agreement 
(dated March 20, 1985) for real property located at R.D. #1, Box 
2 
329-A, Provo, Utah1, (Addendum "A".) The Jensen's entered into an 
Option Contract (dated April 1, 1985) whereby for a sum of $2,500 
the Jensen's had the exclusive right and privilege of purchasing 
the real property located at R.D. #1, Box 329-A, Provo, Utah for 
a period of six months. (Addendum "BM, paragraph 3.) This option 
was renewable for a potential of five additional six month 
periods provided $2,500 was paid for each period prior to the 
expiration of the previous period. (Addendum "B", paragraph 3.) 
Both agreements are supported by individual covenants and 
separate consideration. (See generally Addenda "A" and "B"). The 
lease agreement provided that in return for $462.47 per month 
beginning on the first day of April, 1985, the Jensen's were 
entitled to possession of the property in question for three 
years. (Addendum "A".) The responsibility for maintenance, 
utilities, taxes, insurance, losses, presently existing 
furnishings and fixtures, rental payments including late payments 
^The legal land description is as follows: PARCEL 1: 
Commencing 25.39 chains North and 7.63 chains West of the 
Southeast corner of the Southwest corner of Section 34, township 
6 south, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 
102.8 feet; thence East 168.77 feet; thence 30x 20 ' west 38.74 
feet; thence East 429 feet to the West line of the road; thence 
North 39x 35 ' West 90 feet along said road; thence West 534 feet 
to the place of beginning. 
PARCEL 2: Commencing 25.39 chains North and 7.6 chains West and 
South 102.8 feet of the Southeast corner of the Southwest Quarter 
of Section 4, Township 6 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; thence East 168.777 feet; thence south 30x 20 ' East 
488.02 feet; thence West 430.6 feet; thence North 421.20 feet to 
the place of beginning. 
Together with 1/2 share of the Lake bottom Irrigation Co., Water 
Stock. 
3 
were all openly addressed in the lease agreement. 
On the other hand, the Option Contract provided that in 
return for $2,500, the Jensen's were given the exclusive right 
and privilege of purchasing the property in question for a period 
of six months. The Jensen's were required to make additional 
payments of $2,500 in order to maintain this privilege. The 
price, evidence of title, closing adjustments, and possession 
requirements are all discussed per the written agreement. 
(Addendum "B".) 
The Lease Agreement refers to the Option Contract in that it 
states that the lease period is three years unless it is 
terminated by the lessee's purchase of the premises under the 
Option Contract dated April 1, 1985. (Addendum "A".) The Option 
Contract acknowledges an existing lease agreement between the 
parties but does not express or imply any agreement that the 
Option Contract was dependant upon any consideration other than 
$2,500 payment as stated in the Contract itself. (Addendum "B", 
paragraph 6.) The Lease Agreement could be terminated by the 
exercise of the Option but the Option was not subject to the 
performance or termination of the Lease. (Addendem "C" and 
Addendem "D", paragraph 8.) 
The trial court found that the Jensen's had failed to 
make payments as provided in the Lease Agreement and therefore 
Petitioners were entitled to termination of the lease and the 
^The Lease agreement and the Option Contract can be seen in 
their entirety in the Addenda "A" and "B". 
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receipt of all delinquent payments plus interest from May 12, 
1987, to the present time. (Addendum "E", paragraphs 1, 2, and 
3.) The Trial court also found that the Option Contract was 
still viable and that upon the Jensen's making all future 
required payments pursuant to the Option Contract (and their 
assumption of the loan from the Real Estate Contract dated June 
30, 1978, between Neal as "Sellers" and Bess as "Buyers,") the 
Jensen's were entitled to possession of the property and Quit-
Claim Deed from the Petitioner conveying all of their right, 
title, and interest in the subject property and the Jensen's. 
(Addendum "E", paragraph 8.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The question before this court is one of fact not law. The 
Lease and the Option Contract are distinct and separate 
agreements containing separate consideration and restrictions. 
The test to determine the independence of these contracts is 
whether the express terms of the option are independent of the 
covenants of the lease and whether the two contracts are 
supported by valid consideration. If so, then the option 
continues in existence notwithstanding the lease's termination. 
In compliance with this test a lease and an option can act 
independently of each other despite references to one another. 
Allowing the extinguishment of the Option Contract would create a 
great windfall to the Petitioner, and a greater injustice to the 
Jensen's pursuant to doctrines of reliance embodied in 
Restatement (Second) Of Contracts Sections 87(2) and 90. The 
5 
Jensen's were found to have failed to meet the contingencies of 
the lease and they have lost their rights accordingly; but in 
equity and good conscience they have upheld the bargain under the 
option and have reasonably relied on such. Consequently, the 
intent of the parties will not be frustrated if the Petitioner 
regains fair rental value of his property subject to the Jensen's 
legal option to purchase. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED THE HOLDER OF A LEASE AND 
OPTION TO REAL PROPERTY DOES NOT AS A MATTER OF LAW LOSE BOTH 
LEASE AND OPTION UPON THE DEFAULT OF THE LEASE. 
The Lease and the Option Contract are distinct and separate 
agreements containing separate considerations and restrictions. 
The Appellant has advocated the notion that these two 
separate agreements should be construed as a single contract. 
For justification, the Appellant has relied upon three Court 
cases which are all distinguishable from the present case. In 
Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc., v. Great Northern Baseball, Co., 
73 Utah Advanced Reports 10 (1987), the Utah Supreme Court had to 
determine the enforceability of two simultaneously executed 
contracts. One was for the sale of a baseball franchise for 
$100,000. The second was for consultation services to be 
provided by the seller for $88,000. The Court determined that 
there was never any intention to provide consultation services 
and that the second contract was a sham. The actual selling price 
of the franchise was $188,000 and the parties created the phony 
contract in order to enable the buyer and seller to manipulate 
6 
the tax treatment of the exchange. So when the court said "[a]n 
agreement may be a single contract even though it consists of 
several writings that the parties have never physically attached 
to each other," Id. at 11, they were referring to a situation in 
which there are collateral documents that are unsupported by 
distinct consideration. That is not the case in the present 
case. As stated above, both contracts were independent and both 
were supported by their own consideration. 
Similarly, Land Reclamation, Inc. v. Riverside Corp., 261 
Or. 180, 184, 492 P.2d 263, 265 (1972) is cited as holding that 
the parties can use two written instruments, instead of one, to 
effectually carry on their agreement. In Land Reclamation a 
buyer and seller entered into a contract to convey land. The 
contract required that the buyer use the land for a sanitary 
landfill. The warranty deed which was subsequently executed 
contained no restrictions or conditions. The Oregon Court 
determined that the deed was only a vehicle for passing title to 
the buyer according to the terms of the Contract, and not a 
memoralization of the agreement. Here again, the second document 
which is being merged into the fist is without separate 
consideration. The consideration tendered for the deed is one 
and the same as that declared in the contract. Therefore, the 
Court should treat the two documents as representing one 
agreement. This is not so in the present case because there were 
two separate agreements: one for a lease, the other for an option 
to buy and they each have separate and distinct consideration. 
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Completing his argument, the appellant cites Bledsoe v. 
Hill, 747 P.2d 10 (Colo. App. 1987) as holding that if one 
agreement is contained in more than one instrument, the documents 
must be construed together to determine the intent of the 
parties. This is a true statement of law but it is not decisive 
in this case for three reasons. First, there is not one 
agreement in the case at hand; there are two. Second, even if 
you construe the documents together, there is nothing in either 
of them which indicates that the intent of the parties was to 
make the contracts dependant upon each other. The stated 
exception is that the lease agreement would terminate if the 
option was exercised, but that would occur as a matter of law as 
the Jensen's possessory interest in the property would merge into 
their ownership interest. Finally, as stated in Bledsoe, 
"questions of intent of the parties to a written instrument 
implicate factual issues," !Id at 12. Factual issues are best 
determined by the trier fact and in this case the trier of fact 
has already concluded that the intent of the parties was to make 
independent agreements. 
By advocating the theory that these two separate agreements 
should be construed as one contract, the Appellant hopes to place 
the Jensen's in a situation similar to that of Russell v. Park 
City, Utah, Corp., 548 P.2d 880 (Utah 1976). In Russell, the 
Supreme Court decided a case in which a right of first refusal 
was contained in the same document as a lease contract. The 
Plaintiffs in Russell, terminated the lease agreement of the 
8 
Defendants due to Defendants failure to make timely rental 
payments. Defendants had made annual rental payments for the 
first three years. Late in the fourth year defendant and its 
sublessee, Park West, were in dispute as to how much money Park 
West actually owed Defendant. The defendant then advised Park 
West to make rental Payments directly to the plaintiff to offset 
their debts to defendant. Park West failed to make rental 
payments to Plaintiff as directed by defendant. Early in the 
fifth year plaintiffs sent a letter to defendant's stating that 
if rent was not paid within 45 days, they would terminate the 
lease. The defendants did not meet the deadline, but offered 
payment approximately two weeks late. Plaintiffs refused payment 
and the lease was terminated. Plaintiffs contended that the 
right of purchase was intended as an integral part of the total 
lease; and when the lease was breached the right to purchase also 
was lost. The defendant argued that the first right of refusal 
was an independent contract supported by separate consideration 
($2,000) and independent of the lease for the entire ten year 
term of the lease. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
courtf s decision to terminate the first right of refusal in 
Russell. The rule of law as stated by the Russell Court is: "if 
by the express terms of the option; it can be seen as independent 
of the other covenants of the lease, and is supported by a valid 
consideration; it can continue in existence notwithstanding the 
lease's termination." Russell at 891-92. Citing Prout v. Roby, 
82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 471 (1872). The Russell Court did not apply 
9 
the general rule in favor of the lessee/optionee for three 
reasons: First, both agreements were contained in the same 
document and there was an ambiguity within that document which 
made the intent of the parties uncertain regarding the 
relationship between the agreements. Second, the trial court had 
admitted extraneous evidence to clarify the ambiguity and had 
determined that the intent was for the right of refusal to be an 
integral part of the lease. Third, the intent of the parties was 
a question of fact and the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the 
trial court's decision as the trier of fact. 
In the present case, there is no ambiguity in the contracts. 
The ambiguity in Russell involved a statement in the option 
portion of the contract which stated that "said right to purchase 
to remain in existence during the entire term of the lease, 
(emphasis added) Therefore, there was a legitimate question as 
to whether the option was intended to be dependant upon the 
existence of the lease. Here, there are two separate documents 
with independent consideration. The option terms are six month 
increments and are not based upon the term, or the existence, of 
the lease. The trier of fact has determined that the intent of 
the parties was to enter into two separate and independent 
agreements. According to the rule stated in Prout v. Roby as 
cited in Russell, the option may be permitted to continue in 
existence despite the termination of the lease. 
According to the restatement (second) of contracts Section 
87 (1981): 
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(1) An offer is binding as an option contract if it: 
(a) is in writing and signed by the 
offeror, recites purported 
consideration for the making of the 
offer, and proposes an exchange of fair 
terms within a reasonable time . . . 
(2) An offer which the offeror should reasonably 
expect to induce action or forbearance of a 
substantial character on the part of the offeree 
before acceptance and which does induce such action 
or forbearance is binding as an option contract to 
the extent necessary to avoid injustice. 
Id. 
The Option contract before the court is in harmony with all the 
requirements of Section 87(1) and Section 87(1)(a). In 
conjunction with Section 87(2), Comment e. states that the 
reliance must be "substantial as well as foreseeable". The 
Jensen's have done considerable work on the subject property in 
contemplation of exercising their option including: putting in a 
textured ceiling in the living and dining rooms, wallpapering the 
living dining and bedrooms, painting the living, dining and 
bedrooms, installing a rooftop swamp cooler and a refrigerator 
upstairs, carpeting the upstairs and downstairs bedrooms and 
living room, placing curtains in the living, dining and master 
bedrooms, placing blinds in the bedroom, replacing the main water 
line to the house, planting numerous large trees on the property, 
replacing a wall in the shower, replacing the septic tank, 
repairing the general plumbing and restringing the fence. 
Through the aforementioned improvements, and others, the Jensen's 
have developed equity in the property of approximately $30,000 in 
the subject property which includes the six payments of $2,500 
11 
each according to the Option Contract which were accepted and 
cashed by the Petitioners• Not only are these improvements and 
equity substantial, they were foreseeable by Petitioner. 
Allowing the extinguishment of the Option Contract would create a 
windfall to the Petitioner, and an extreme injustice to the 
Jensen's pursuant to doctrines of reliance embodied in 
Restatement (Second) Of Contracts Sections 87 (2) and 90 (1981).3 
The trial court's decision to maintain the Option Contract 
conforms with the objective theory of contracts. This common law 
theory bases the assent to a contract not on the subjective 
intention of the party, but on what a reasonable person would 
have thought from the party's conduct. From this approach the 
Jensen's are well within the scope of a reasonable man standard 
to believe that the two agreements, each capable of standing 
alone, could be treated as such. The allowance of the option is 
not unconscionable because possession reverts back to the lessor 
subject to the Jensen's option to buy. This scenario is 
identical to that in Russell, when the court stated, "after the 
lease was terminated as delineated above, the plaintiffs were 
free to rent the property to Park West or anyone else, as the 
trial court correctly ruled." Id.. The Jensen's have failed to 
meet the contingencies of the lease and they have lost their 
^A promise which the promisor should reasonable expect to 
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or third 
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is 
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice 
requires. 
12 
rights accordingly, but in equity and good conscience they have 
upheld the bargain under the option and have reasonably relied on 
such; consequently, the intent of the parties will not be 
frustrated if the Petitioner regains fair rental value of his 
property subject to the Jensen's legal option to purchase. 
CONCLUSION 
In conjunction with the test set forth in Russell and the 
doctrines of reliance and equity, the Respondents respectfully 
request the Court to hold that the lease contract and the Option 
Contract are separate and independent, thus upholding the 
factually based decision of the trial court. 
Respectfully subrnpLt^ pd this ( K 1 /7 day of August, 1988. 
Frederick A (Jackman, #1632 
Attorney for^che Defendants/Respondents 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
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Addendum "A": Lease Agreement 
•THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT IF NOT UNDERSTOOD. SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE." 
Jleas* 
J . DESMOND BESS • n d j a m T O ^ 
P.O. Box 134 
_, County of ........ Lale, ^^ii^J62^1^ ^^^f}jp^ 
harainafUr rafarrad to aa landlord, haraby remise, release and lat to ...JffiH*MLl..... JJJSS.8]lJlMJE«JXKJA JENSEN 
of ..MP.?i..J?.92Li.?.?,i H9Y.9 County of .U.t«Jb State of Utah, 
hereinafter rafarrad to aa tenant, all thoaa pramiaaa situate, lying and baing in tha ™ -
,~—~............... _.ij...u.LiiniiM,iiiil. •••••• i . .I., i - - - of , LU..,., ,.,„•„,„„ ............... County of 
and Stata of Utah, commonly known aa ._.__«»._.... 
and mora particularly described aa followa, to wit: , 
INCORPORATED HEREIN) 
Utah 
(See Exhibit "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND 
(Lagal Daacription) 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD tha aaid pramiaaa, togathar with tha appurtanancaa, unto tha tenant, from tha .!&£ 
day of * P l i i . A.D. 1*J?JL, for and during and until tha ..!$*!>. day of AprU AJ). 
19 **8 a term of three years unless terminated by Lessee's purchase of said premises 
"'an Op tion'*aate3 "AprlTTTlWS".* under And Unant covenant* and agraaa to pay to landlord aa rantal for aaid pramiaaa, tha sum *F. 
continuing on the fIrst day of each month thereafter durinOt the term hereof ._^ 
And tenant further agrees to deliver up aaid pramiaaa to landlord at the expiration of aaid term in ai good order 
and condition ai when the aame were entered upon by tenant, raaaonabla uae and waar thereof and damage by the 
elements excepted, and the tenant will not let or underlet aaid premises, or any part thereof without the written 
conaant of landlord fint had and obtained, which consent will not be unreasonably withheld. 
And tenant further convenanta and agrees that if aaid rent above reserved or any part thereof shall be unpaid 
for ?.?.n. days after the same shall beeome due; or if default in any of tha covenants herein contained to be 
kept by tenant is not cured within . f i v e , days from written notice, or if tenant shall vacate such pramiaaa. 
landlord may elect, without notice or lagal process, to re-enter and take possession of aaid premiaes and every and 
any part thereof and re-let the same and apply the net proceeds so received upon the amount due or to become 
due under this lease, and tenant agraaa to pay any deficiency. 
Responsibility for the maintenance shall be aa indicated: Tenant responsible (T), Landlord responsible for (L). 
Roof......! , Exterior Walla....1 Interior Walla^.JT—, Structural Repair....!—, Interior Decorating—I—, 
Exterior Painting...!—, Yard Surfacing™-!—, Plumbing Equipment....!—, Heating and Air Conditioning Equip-
T T 
ment „.., Electrical Equipment.?-. Snow Removal...!—, Janitor..._L., Others 
LakeBotton I r r i g a t i o n Co. 
_, Light Globes and Tubes,..!..—, Glass Breakage...! , Trash Removals?-. 
Responsibility for utilities, taxes and insurance shall be as indicated: Tenant responsible for (T), Landlord res-
ponsible for (L). 
Power... ., HentJL , Water.. »Telephone . 
above 19.§-3.~ in Real Property Tax 
Insurance on Personal Property ! , Glass Insuranra I^.n Other 
~, Real Property tax...*: , Incrosso 
, Personal Property Tax.—£_., Fire Insurance) on Building k~, Firs 
Each party shall be responsible for losses resulting from negligence or misconduct of himself, his employees 
or invitees. 
Furniture, fixtures and personal property of tenant may not be removed from the pramiaaa until rent and other 
charges are fully paid. 
In case of failure to faithfully perform the terms and covenants herein set forth, the defaulting party shall pay 
ail costs, expenaes, and raaaonabla attorneys tmt resulting from the enforcement of thia agreement or any right 
arising out of such breach. 
.If.P.a.at..s.!x^ 
a<;^^vcrBajL Campus Credit Union In Provo^ Utah 
Witness the hands and seals of aaid landlord.-? and aaid tenant8 .— at. 
thia ...JS.th. day of tt*I£h AJD. I9...E5 
Signed in presence of 
Provo, Utah 
co^u^^ 
^ • ^ ( S - . , 
RoiMld L. .lentifni 
Patrlcti'i Jensen 
S4AMK * • . •••— A O •»« »r«. <• - »••• ••• •••» **•» - • • " ***** c , T f 
EXHIBIT "A" 
DESCRIPTION: 
PARCEL 1: Commencing 25.39 chains North and 7.63 chains Vest of the Southeast coner 
of the Southwest quarter of Section 34, Tovnshlp 6 South, Range 2 Eaat, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; thence South 102.8 feet; thence East 168.77 feet; thence North 30* 20' 
Vest 38.74 feet; thence East 429 feet to the Vest line of the Road; thence Worth 39* 35* 
Vest 90 feet along said road; thence Vest 534 feet to the place of beginning. 
PARCEL 2: Commencing 25.39 chains North and 7.63 chains Vest and South 102.8 feet of 
the Southeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 34, Tovnshlp 6 South, Range 2 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence East 168.77 feet; thence South 30* 20' East 
488.02 feet; thence Vest 430.6 feet; thence North 421.20 feet to the place of beginning. 
Together with 1/2 share of Lake Bottom Irrigation Water. 
Addendum "B": Option Contract 
-THIS IS A LCGAUY IINDING CONTtACT. IF NOT UNOfHSTOOD. StIK COMPtUNT ADVICE." 
O P T I O N 
:NOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
T n l l J v . D B ^ i j ^ _ 
f ?.;..°! J ? * J.?*^J-.**e..t...!***?** .?^ .7.9.?rPA.?*
 v. hereinafter referred lo as "Seller, hereby agrees for and in con-
.deration of T ^ . ™ ? y $ ^ P « J ^ (%~l*.59.9.2.99 ) Dollara, 
aid by ..JMM&O^ I1ZZZZI 
f *£? J l t JJox J 2 ^ hereinafter referred to as "Buyer, aa follows: 
1. PROPERTY: Seller hereby gives and grants to Buyer and to his heirs and assigns for a period of ...fL.. months from 
te date hereof, hereinafter referred to as T int Option Period", the exclusive right and privilege of purchasing the follow* 
if described real property located at JL£j:J!.JkjLJ&*.J*!t*i~J&9X9.. , County of 
K£*!? . State of y.£a!?.
 ; — and more particularly described 
t follows: 
(SEE EXHIBIT "A" APPEARING ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, INCORPORATED HEREIN 
FOR DESCRIPTION) 
Together with 1/2 share of Lake Bottom Irrigation Co., Water Stock. 
ogether with all water rights appurtenant thereto or used in connection therewith. 
Said real property and Improvements, if any, ahall hereinafter be referred to as "The Property**). 
2. PRICE. The total purchase price for said property Is . . J ! i ! ? J ! ! ^ ^ 
i-.8O.1PO.Q4.OQ ) Dollars, payable In lawful money of the United States, strictly within the following times, to-wlt All 
ims paid for this option and any extension thereof aa herein provided, shall be first applied on the purchase price, and the 
ilance ahall be paid as follows: 
T o t a l down payment i n c l u d i n g funds paid hereunder t o be $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
luyer t o assume e x i s t i n g l o a n from Real e s t a t e Contract dated June 3 0 , 1978 , by and between 
Jtephen Wil l iam Neal and Barbara Ann Nea l , a s S e l l e r and J . Desmond.Bess and K r l s t i n e B e s s , 
Buyers in accordance, with the terms thereof. Balance of S e l l e r ' s equity to be paid together 
h in teres t thereon at the rate of 11.5 Z per annum in equal annual installments including 
xrtCipal and in teres t in the amount of $3,000.00, with f i r s t installment due one year after 
xerc i se of option and annually thereafter unt i l s e l l e r s equity i s paid in f u l l . 
3. EXTENSION OF OPTION. Upon payment by Buyer to Seller of an additional sum of „™PlTS5V^D_FIVE— 
tUHDRED ANDNO/100 - - - - - - - - - - - - , - <$JL5.Q.(L0& ) Dollars, cash or by cashier's 
ieck, prior to the expiration of the first option period, this option shsll be extended for JBix —..... months, herein-
ter referred to as "Second Option Period". Upon Buyer's payment to Seller of a further aum of ^TJ,!9.rIH91!SAJ!S.JE.?.il.^  
^ M f t j ^ - ^ $....2,500*00 ) Dollars, prior to the explra-
>n of the second option period, this option shall be extended for a third period of S3JL _ additional months, 
•reinafter referred to as 'Third Option Period".. Upon Buyer*8 payment to Seller of a further sum of 
W0-TH0USAND FIVE HUNDRED AND N0/00 t$2,500.00) Dollars, prior to the expiration of the third 
ption period, this option shall be extended for a fourth period of 6ix additidnal months, 
ereinalter .referred as "Fourth Option Period", Upon Buyer's payment to Seller of a further 
urn of TWO-THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND NO/100 ($2,500.00) Dollars, prior to the expiration of 
he Fourth Option period, this option shall be extended for a fifth period of (SEE BELOW *) 
4. EXERCISE OF OPTION. This option shall be exercised by written notice to Seller on or before the expiration of 
e first option period, or If extended, the expiration of the second or third option periods as the case may be. Notice to 
erciae this option or to extend the option for the addltlonaloption period, whether personally delivered or mailed to 
Her at his address as Indicated after Seller's signature hereto, by registered or certified mall, postage prepaid, and post-
arked on or before such date of explratlon./ahall be timely and shall be deemed actual notice to Seller. 
or within 10 days thereafter 
*. EVIDENCE OF TITLE. 
(a) Promptly after the execution of this option, Seller shall deliver to Buyer for examination such abstracts of title, 
le policies, and other evidences of title as the Seller may have. In the event this option is not exercised by Buyer, all 
ch evidences of title shsll be Immediately returned without expense to Seller. 
(b) In the event this option Is exercised as herein provided. Seller agrees to pay all abstracting expense or at Seller's 
tion to furnish a policy of title insurance in the name of the Buyer. 
(c) If an examination of the title should reveal defects in the title. Buyer shall notify Seller In writing thereof, 
d Seller agrees to forthwith take all reasonable action to clear the title. If the Seller does not clear title within a reaeon-
le time, Buyer may do so at Seller's expense. Seller agrees to make final conveyance by Warranty Deed or
 M 
.^.«..^ _ ^. In the event of sale of other than real property. If either party fails to perform 
i provisions of this agreement, the party at fault agrees to pay sll costs of enforcing this agreement, or any right arising 
t of the breach thereof, including a reasonable Attorney's fee. 
six additional months, hereinafter referred to as "Fifth Option period". Upon Buyer's 
payment to Seller of a further sum of TWO-THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND NO/100 ($2,500.00) 
Dollars, prior to the expiration of the Fifth option period, this option shall be extended 
for a sixth period of six addition monUis hcrelnaltcr referred to ay "NiMh Opt inn Period". 
Buyer shall h.-ivis a 10 day
 Rrace period after expiration dare of each option to maker 
payment.'; Ui c.:LuJ the option lor t,uli option period. 
I. CLOSING ADJUSTMENTS. All risk of loss and destruction of property *intl exix-nsc* or insurance shjll be borne by 
Jer until date of position. At time of doting of sale, pro|»erty taxes, rents, insurance, Interest and other expenses of 
operty shall be ptorated a* of date of possession. All other taxes, Including documentary taxes, and all assessments, 
ortgage liens and other Hens, encumbrances or chaiges against the property of any nature, shall be paid by Seller except 
as required by Buyer^under^jexisting> lease as a tenant. ** _ 
7. POSSESSION. Seller agrees to surrender possession of the property KX&iptiWttHXX
 M ~. _ . JUi& following 
ritten notice of the exercising of this option by Buyer., and c los ing of sale through Escrow * at Security 
Ti t l e and Abstract Company. 
$. The Seller recognises J49Jte N/A. Heal Estate Company 
Iroker and Agent) through its salesman .. None .~ «... ,., . 
the Real Estate Broker with whom Seller listed this property for sale, and Seller agrees to pay a commission to said 
-oker equal to . No?.e... %• of the gross sale price, and Seller hereby authoi izes the ageni to withhold such commission from 
t proceeds of sale at time of closing. 
or within ten days thereafter 
t. If this option be not exercised on or before the dates specified herein/for exercise of same, the option shall expire 
its own force and effect and the Seller may retain such option monies as have been paid to the Seller as full consideration 
r the granting of this option. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Seller hereunto has set his name this A?.' day of AElii _ _ * 
—£$.•- ** Any insurance funds paid to Se l l er for damage, l o s s , or destruction of dwelling 
• h a l l be used to replace or repair said dwelling to original condition. 
CNED IN PRESENCE OF; 
^^g^SS^ 
Kristine Bess Seller 
Address of Seller. !!.!&•• JfflSJ^JL 
Laic, Hawaii 96762-0134 
JU»PftOVtD rOMM — UTAH STATI 
s u m * N « . i i e— A O • • « * ' • c©. — » •» —> t— *»•? — SAW? L A W CITT 
EXHIBIT "A" 
DESCRIPTION: 
PARCEL 1: Commencing 25.39 chains North and 7.63 chains Vest of the Southeast coner 
of the Southwest quarter of Section 34, Township 6 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; thence South 102.8 feet; thence East 168.77 feet; thence North 30* 201 
West 38.74 feet; thence East 429 feet to the West line of the Road; thence Nprth 39* 35' 
West 90 feet along said road; thence West 534 feet to the place of beginning. 
PARCEL 2: Commencing 25.39 chains North and 7.63 chains West and South 102.8 feet of 
the Southeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 34, Township 6 South, Range 2 
East, Salt lake Base and Meridian; thence East 168,77 feet; thence South 30* 20* East 
488.02 feet; thence West 430.6 feet; thence North 421.20 feet to the place of beginning. 
Together with 1/2 share of Lake Bottom Irrigation Water. 
APPROVED: March 20, 1985 
Addendum "C": Decision of Judge Ballif dated 
January 28, 1988 
F'LEO 
FOURTH juDirut i::f •"!(: ror :-i 
1983 JAN 28 PH fc: 2G 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 




RONALD L. JENSEN and 
PATRICIA JENSEN, 
Defendants. 
Case Number CV 87 1258 
DECISION 
******** 
This matter came before the court for trial on the 1st 
day of December, 1987, Orson B. West, Jr. appearing for the 
plaintiffs and Frederick A. Jackman appearing for the defendants. 
The parties filed with the court a written stipulation 
of fact augmented by oral proffers, argued the case and submitted 
it to the court for decision. 
The court having fully considered the matter now enters 
its: 
DECISION 
In this matter the court finds the issues as they 
pertain to termination of the lease (attached to complaint as 
Exhibit A) in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant 
and finds that the lease payments as provided in said lease are 
delinquent from and after the month of May, 1987, until the 
present-time. The same having been due and payable on the first 
day of each month, and delinquent from and after the 10th day of 
each month. 
Pursuant to the stipulated facts and proffers made, the 
court further finds that the plaintiffs served a notice to quit 
upon the defendants by personal service on Patricia Jensen, one 
of the co-tenants, on May 21, 1907, which notice sought the 
payment of one month's rent which plaintiffs had declined on the 
12th day of May, 1987, or that suit for treble damages would be 
commenced. This notice was ineffective as to the treble damage 
for unlawful detainer in that plaintiff had already refused the 
cash tender of the delinquent payment for the month of May. 
Based on the letters of plaintiff's counsel to 
defendants dated March 9 and April 10 (Exhibits no. 3 and 5) 
concerning past delinquencies and future strict compliance with 
the lease provisions as to payment, it is clear that the intent 
of Exhibit #6 was to get the defendants out of possession of the 
property, and that the letter of Universal Campus Credit dated 
May 14, 1987, (Exhibit No. 7) and the notice in Exhibit No. 6 to 
deliver up possession was sufficient notice to defendants' that 
the lease was considered terminated by the plaintiffs due to the 
May delinquency. Any confusion created by the service of Exhibit 
No. 6 and defendants failure to respond thereto, was put to rest 
when plaintiff filed this action to terminate the lease on May 
29, 1987, and served summons and complaint on June 4, 1987. 
Pingres v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 (1976). 
See also Johnson v. Austin, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 40. 
The plaintiff is entitled to a termination of the lease 
and the receipt of all payments tendered, plus interest, in the 
amount of the monthly rental from May 12, 1987, to the present 
time. The court finds that the lease payments are the reasonable 
rental value of the premises for the period of defendant's 
occupancy from and after May of 1987. 
Plaintiff is also entitled to attorney's fees for 
prosecuting the termination of the lease agreement. 
As to the claims of the plaintiff to forfeit the 
payments made under the option agreement, the court finds the 
issues against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant, that 
said option agreement is still viable and that all payments made 
thereunder have been consistent and in accordance with the 
obligations imposed upon the defendant to pay pursuant to the 
option agreement, and upon the defendant counterclaimants making 
all of the additional required payments thereunder, and their 
assumption of the loan from the real estate contract dated June 
30, J978, between NeaJ as selJcrs and Boss as buyers, the 
defendants will be entitled to possession of the property and a 
quit claim deed from the plaintiff conveying all of their right, 
title and interest in the subject property to Jensens. 
The defendants are entitled to their attorney's fees 
against the plaintiff for defending their rights pursuant to the 
option contract. The court considers that the attorney fees and 
costs cancel, so that each party will bear their own. 
Counsel are directed to prepare appropriate findings 
consistent with rulings in their favor herein, and submit same to 
the court for signing and entry as one judgment and decree in 
this matter. 
DATED at Provo, Utah, this 2, Y day of January, 1988. 
GEORGE C. BALtlF, JUDGE 
Addendum "D": Judgment and Order dated April 6, 1988 
is:d APP - . 
FREDERICK A. JACKMAN, #1632 
Artorney for Defendant 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
(801) 225-1632 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. DESMOND BESS and 
KRISTINE BESS, 
Plaintiffs, 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER ^ 




Civil No. CV87-1258 
This matter came before the Court for trial on the 1st day 
of December, 1987, Orson B. West, Jr., appearing for the 
plaintiffs and Frederick A. Jackman appearing for the defendants. 
The parties filed with the Court a written Stipulation of fact 
augmented by oral proffers, argued the case and submitted it to 
the Court for its decision. The Court having heretofore entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause 
appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The defendants failed to make lease payments as provided 
in the Lease Agreement. 
2. The defendants are delinquent in their lease payments 
from May, 1987, until the present time. 
3. Lease payments have been due and payable on the 1st day 
of each month and are delinquent from and after the 10th day of 
each month. 
4. The plaintiffs are not entitled to treble damages. 
5. Plaintiffs are entitled to termination of the Lease and 
the receipt of all payments tendered plus interest in the amount 
of the monthly rental from May 12, 1987, to the present time. 
6. The lease payments are the reasonable rental value of 
the premises for the period of defendantsf occupancy from and 
after May of 1987. 
7. Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees for 
prosecuting the termination of the lease. 
8. The Option Agreement is still viable and that all 
payments thereunder have been consistent and in accordance with 
the obligations imposed upon the defendant to pay pursuant to the 
Option Agreement. 
9. That upon the defendants' making all of the additional 
required payments pursuant to the Option Agreement and their 
assumption of the loan from the Real Estate Contract dated June 
30, 1978, between Neal as "Sellers" and Bess as "Buyers", the 
defendants will be entitled to possession of the property and a 
2 
Quit-Claim Deed to the defendant from the plaintiff conveying 
all of their right, title and interest in the subject property to 
the defendants. 
10. The defendants are entitled to their attorney's fees 
against the plaintiffs for defending their rights pursuant to the 
Option Agreement. 
11. The Court considers the attorney's fees and costs 
cancelled so that each party will bear their own costs and 
attorney's fees. 
DATED this £ day o f ^ s t < 1988. 
GEORGE <gf. BALLIF 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t Judg 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
n Q 7 /? 
ORSON B. WEST ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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Addendum "E": Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
dated April 6, 1988 
CS3AFR -G M 
FREDERICK A. JACKMAN, #1632 
Attorney for Defendant 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
(801) 225-1632 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. DESMOND BESS and 
KRISTINE BESS, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiffs, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. 
RONALD L. JENSEN and 
PATRICIA JENSEN, JUDGE BALLIF 
Civil No. CV87-1258 
Defendants 
This matter came before the Court for trial on the 1st day 
of December, 1987, Orson B. West, Jr., appearing for the 
plaintiffs and Frederick A. Jackman appearing for the defendants. 
The parties filed with the Court a written Stipulation of fact 
augmented by oral proffers, argued the case and submitted it to 
the Court for its decision. The Court having fully considered 
the matter, now enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendants•failed to make lease payments as provided 
in the Lease Agreement. 
2. The defendants are delinquent in their lease payments 
1 
from May, 1987, until the present time. 
3. Lease payments have been due and payable on the 1st day 
of each month and are delinquent from and after the 10th day of 
each month. 
4. The plaintiffs are not entitled to treble damages. 
5. Plaintiffs are entitled to termination of the Lease and 
the receipt of all payments tendered plus interest in the amount 
of the monthly rental from May 12, 1987, to the present time. 
6. The Court finds that the lease payments are the 
reasonable rental value of the premises for the period of 
defendants' occupancy from and after May of 1987. 
7. Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees for 
prosecuting the termination of the lease. 
8. The Court finds that the Option Agreement is still 
viable and that all payments thereunder have been consistent and 
in accordance with the obligations imposed upon the defendant to 
pay pursuant to the Option Agreement. 
9. That upon the defendants' making all of the additional 
required payments pursuant to the Option Agreement and their 
assumption of the loan from the Real Estate Contract dated June 
30, 1978, between Neal as "Sellers" and Bess as "Buyers", the 
defendants will be entitled to possession of the property and a 
Quit-Claim Deed to the defendant from the plaintiff conveying 
2 
all of their right, title and interest in the subject property to 
the defendants. 
10. The defendants are entitled to their attorney's fees 
against the plaintiffs for defending their rights pursuant to the 
Option Agreement. 
11. The Court considers the attorney's fees and costs 
cancelled so that each party will bear their own costs and 
attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendants breached the Lease Agreement and the Lease is 
hereby terminated. 
2. The plaintiffs are entitled to judgment in the amount of 
$462.47 per month commencing from May, 1987, to the present, with 
interest at the rate of 10% per annum thereon. 
3. Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees and Court 
costs. 
4. The Option Agreement is still viable as between the 
parties and all payments made thereunder have been consistent and 
in accordance with the obligation imposed upon the defendants to 
pay pursuant to the Option Agreement. 
5. That upon the defendants' making all of the additional 
required payments thereunder, and their assumption of the loan 
from the Real Estate Contract dated June 30, 1978, between Neal 
3 
as "Sellers" and Bess as "Buyers", the plaintiff shall convey the 
property by Quit-Claim Deed to the defendants and at that time 
the defendants will be entitled to possession of the properties. 
6. The defendants are entitled to their attorney's fees 
against the plaintiff and such attorney's fees shall act as a 
set-off as against the attorney's fees awarded to the plaintiff 
and therefore, the attorney's fees cancel so that each party will 
bear their own costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED this &" day of ftg^feW*/1988, 
^GEORGE E. (bALLIF ^ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ORSON B. WEST 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that 4 true and correct copies of the 
foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF were mailed, postage prepaid, on the 
day of August, 1988, to the following: 
Bradley R. Jones, #A4747 
Attorney at Law 
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103 
Murray, Utah 84107 
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